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Abstract
Memory for action is enhanced if individuals are allowed to perform the corresponding movements, compared to when
they simply listen to them (enactment effect). Previous studies have shown that individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders
(ASD) have difficulties with processes involving the self, such as autobiographical memories and self performed actions. The
present study aimed at assessing memory for action in Asperger Syndrome (AS). We investigated whether adults with AS
would benefit from the enactment effect when recalling a list of previously performed items vs. items that were only visually
and verbally experienced through three experimental tasks (Free Recall, Old/New Recognition and Source Memory). The
results showed that while performance on Recognition and Source Memory tasks was preserved in individuals with AS, the
enactment effect for self-performed actions was not consistently present, as revealed by the lower number of performed
actions being recalled on the Free Recall test, as compared to adults with typical development. Subtle difficulties in
encoding specific motor and proprioceptive signals during action execution in individuals with AS might affect retrieval of
relevant personal episodic information. These disturbances might be associated to an impaired action monitoring system.
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Introduction
Autism spectrum disorders (ASD) are pervasive developmental
disorders characterized by abnormal social interaction, verbal
and non-verbal communication problems and restricted interests.
Within the domain of ASD, High functioning autism (HFA)
commonly refers to individuals meeting criteria for autism with
normal intellectual functioning and a history of speech and
language delay. Those at the higher-functioning end of the HFA
group, sometimes diagnosed with Asperger Syndrome (AS) [1,2]
show no evidence of delayed language function and their
intellectual abilities fall within the normal range. As with other
individuals with ASD, the clinical features of HFA and AS
include troubles forming friendships, difficulties with social
cognition, inappropriate social interactions, poor communication,
restricted interests and diminished capacity for empathy.
Importantly and contrary to the more severe forms of autism,
individuals with AS may pass tests of Theory of Mind (ToM), i.e.,
tests evaluating the ability to attribute mental states, such as
intentions, beliefs and desires, to oneself and others [3].
Specifically, individuals with AS can often solve first-order (e.g.
‘‘Sally thinks it’s x, when really it’s y’’) and second-order false
beliefs tests (e.g. ‘‘Sally thinks Mary thinks x, but both Sally and
Mary are wrong’’) [4,5], although they might fail more
‘advanced’ ToM tasks, based on detection of sarcasm, irony or
bluff [6] or on recognition of Faux Pas [7,8].
In recent years, there have been relatively few experimental
studies on action memory in adults with ASD and many findings
remain controversial, revealing a pattern of both spared and
impaired capacities. Individuals with HFA or AS are often
described as endowed with prodigious memory capacities, and
capable of memorizing large quantities of information [9].
Immediate memory span [10], cued recall [11,12] and recognition
seem to be preserved, at least in autistic individuals without global
cognitive impairment [13]. However, other studies have found
that free recall is often impaired and moderate impairments in
episodic memory have been reported in these individuals for tasks
requiring a high degree of attentional control, or the use of
complex organizing strategies [14,15,16]. More recently, adults
with AS were found to recall fewer specific details in autobio-
graphical memories, and to express their identities using
significantly more abstract trait-linked statements than comparison
participants [17,18].
Previous studies also indicate that individuals with ASD may be
less accurate on source monitoring tasks [19–22]. Source
monitoring refers to the ability to recall the origins of memories,
knowledge and beliefs and involves the spatiotemporal context
under which a memory is acquired. It is thought to be related to
the episodic memory system and to play a crucial role in
discriminating self-other information [23]. However, other studies
have shown that some types of source monitoring ability are
preserved in individuals with ASD with an otherwise normal
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procedures are used during recall [19].
Russell and Jarrold [25] explained difficulties with memory for
self-performed actions in a group of children with autism in terms
of monitoring deficits. The authors required participants to
remember whether they or the experimenter had placed a picture
card on a grid, either on their own behalf or on behalf of a doll
partner. They argued that difficulties in recalling whether a
placement had been made by themselves or another individual in
children with autism would be due to the failure to monitor their
actions as their own. However, Hill and Russell [26] attempted to
replicate Russell and Jarrold’s experiment, but reported intact self-
other source attribution in children with autism. More recently,
Williams and Happe ´ [27] found that, when compared to IQ-
matched comparison participants, individuals with ASD recall
their own actions better than those of the experimenter showing a
typical self-reference effect. In contrast with this finding, other
studies have shown a reduced self-reference effect in individuals
with ASD [28–30]. Millward and collaborators [28] reported that
children with autism have a specific difficulty with the recall of
personally experienced events, as compared with memory for
events experienced by a peer. Using a recognition test, Toichi and
collaborators [29] showed that adults with HFA do not benefit
from the self-reference effect since they are impaired in processing
words in a self-related manner, in the absence of semantic and
phonological impairments. More recently, Hare, Mellor and Azmi
[30] found that adults with ASD demonstrate superiority for self-
experienced events over events merely observed when the recall is
cued whilst this superiority effect disappeared in free recall.
Despite these contradictory results, substantial evidence supports
the notion of a diminished memory for personal knowledge,
although the degree to which this impairment relates to
inadequate encoding, action monitoring impairments, introspec-
tive limitations or faulty recall remains poorly understood. In fact,
there are some grounds for supposing that difficulties with memory
for self-performed action in individuals with ASD might relate to
an executive dysfunction, and in particular to action monitoring
impairments [31,32].
The ‘Central Monitoring Theory’ is a predominant account on
explaining impairments in motor learning and motor control
[33,34]. According to this theory, internal models are implement-
ed in the central motor system. Predictive models use efferent
copies that predict the sensory consequences of a given motor
command, which are eventually compared to the actual sensory
outcome [35]. The matching between central motor signals and
visual, tactile and proprioceptive feedback that arise during action
execution, together with the associated action intention, is thought
to be a crucial mechanism involved in action monitoring. This
mechanism might fail in ASD [36].
It is well known that motor and proprioceptive signals
preponderantly function in the absence of awareness and might
thus covertly affect memory strength [37]. In particular, Engelk-
amp [38] has demonstrated that the processes related to motor
performance provide verbal memories with more durable
representations than those received from external sources (i.e.
action observation or verbal semantic description). Specifically,
memory performance for a list of simple action sentences (e.g.,
open an umbrella) is increased if the listener simultaneously
executes the corresponding action. The memory enhancement for
enacted compared to visually or verbally encoded items - called
the enactment effect – [38] is effective in terms of both accuracy
and processing speed of the retrieved information. This facilitation
relies on a form of procedural learning that implicitly favors the
enacted items, being relatively independent of conscious access to
the encoded information. In agreement with these observations,
people are better at recalling events that they have personally
experienced compared to events experienced by another person to
whom they attended [39].
The present study aimed at assessing whether adults with AS
would benefit from the enactment effect when recalling a list of
previously enacted items vs. items that were only visually and
verbally experienced. The presence of this memory facilitation was
tested through a Free Recall test and an Old/New Recognition
task. Furthermore, we investigated whether these individuals can
overtly distinguish self-performed actions from actions performed
by others through a Source Memory Recognition task. Adults with
AS exhibited a reduced enactment effect on the Free Recall test,
while on the Recognition and the Source Memory tasks their
performance was comparable to that of adults with typical
development. These results may be explained in terms of an
impaired action monitoring system, likely associated with
difficulties in encoding specific motor signals during action
execution that would affect retrieval of relevant personal episodic
information.
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
The present research has been approved by the local Ethical
committee (Inserm, C07). All participants signed informed consent
before volunteering for this study, and all investigation has been
conducted according to the principles expressed in the Declaration
of Helsinki.
Participants
Eighteen adults with a clinical diagnosis of Asperger Syndrome
(AS) according to DSM-IV R [1] and ASDI (Asperger Syndrome
Diagnostic Interview) [40] were recruited from Albert Chenevier
Hospital in Cre ´teil (see Table 1 for details). The inclusion criteria
for the sample were based on retrospective parental information
about the early language development of their child. All diagnoses
were made by experienced clinicians and were based on clinical
observations of the participants. Interviews with parents or
caregivers using the ADI-R (Autism Diagnostic Interview) [41]
confirmed the diagnoses. The cut-off points for the three classes of
behaviour are reciprocal social interaction 10, communication 8,
and stereotyped behaviours 3, respectively. All participants scored
above the cut-off points.
As part of the checking process, the French translation of A-
TAC (Autism, tics, AD-HD and other comorbidities) [42] was
completed by the parents. This screening questionnaire is focused
on a number of abilities, conducts and behaviours in a child’s
functioning as compared to his or her peers. Parents are asked to
report any problem or specific characteristic observed at any
period of life, even when this is no longer present.
Eighteen comparison participants with typical development
volunteered to match the clinical group with respect to age, IQ
and gender (see Table 1 for details). Prior to their recruitment, the
comparison participants were screened to exclude any with a
history of psychiatric or neurological disorders. All participants
were native French speakers, and had normal/corrected to normal
vision.
All participants received basic neuropsychological screening,
which included Verbal and Performance IQs (WAIS-III) [43]. All
participants had an IQ above 70. Overall, individuals with AS did
not differ from the comparison participants on chronological age
(t-test: t(34)=.71, p=.48, r=.11), IQ level (Full-scale, Verbal and
Performance: t-test: t(30)=20.10, p=.91, r=2.01; t(30)=.23,
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also underwent an exploration of verbal memory functions
through the French adaptation of the Grober & Buschke Test
[44] and scored within the normal range. To evaluate mind-
reading abilities, participants were administered an advanced
ToM task, the Faux-pas Recognition Test [8]. Here, the group
with AS scored significantly lower than the comparison group
(t(30)=4.98, p,.0001, r=.67), consistently with what is expected
from the clinical presentation of the syndrome (see Table 1). Data
from three comparison subjects were excluded from analysis
because they did not conform to the selection criteria.
Procedure
The experiment consisted of two parts that were run in one
session, with a brief interval in between. Instructions for the two
parts were given separately to the participants (for details see also
[45]. In part I, participants stood in front of a computer screen
located approximately 1.5m from their frontal plane. They were
informed that a red or a green dot (262cm) would appear on the
upper third of the screen. This event would be followed by a
recorded male voice describing an action sentence, and next by
the video of an actor pantomiming the corresponding action (see
Figure 1 for details).
Participants were asked to listen to the sentence and according
to the dot’s colour (which was meant as a cue), either watch the
pantomimed action (red dot) or simultaneously execute the
movement described by the sentence (green dot). They were
informed that in part II, they would be interviewed about what
they heard, saw and performed, but no explicit reference to a
formal memory test was ever made. Eight 30-item lists were
created, each including 15 to-be-enacted items (enacted) and 15
to-be-observed ones (observed). Each trial was triggered by an
experimenter.
Order of list presentation was fully counterbalanced across
participants. All lists were drawn from a pool of 60 action phrases
and were comparable in terms of length and frequency of use of
the corresponding words (see Appendix S1).
In part II, three separate measures of memory for action
sentences were collected in the following sequence. First, a Free
Recall test, in which participants were required to write down all
the sentences they remembered from part I, by reporting the items
as accurately as possible. A time limit of 5-min was given for task
completion. The second measure was an Old/New Recognition
task, in which participants viewed a list of 60 sentences that
appeared one at a time, in the centre of a computer screen. For
each sentence, participants decided whether it corresponded to an
item that had previously appeared in part I (old item) or not (new
item). Participants responded by pressing one of two adjacent keys
(new, old) as fast and as accurately as possible. The last measure
was a Source Memory task, in which participants viewed the 60-
sentence list a second time and decided whether old items
corresponded to enacted or observed items. Response was given
by pressing one of three keys (new, enacted, observed) as fast and
as accurately as possible.
Part I and II, and the three measures of recall were separated by
short intervals (5 to 10 min each), during which participants were
engaged in a visuo-spatial task.
Data collection and analyses
In part I, performance of participants was monitored by two
experimenters. Performance was scored as correct based on the
fact that pantomime was recognizable, and did not include spatial
or temporal errors or use of hands as objects, and similar mistakes.
If errors occurred, the trial was singled out to be discarded.
Procedural errors were absent in both the comparison and the
experimental group. In part II, responses for the three memory
tasks were collected and analysed as follows.
For Free Recall, items were scored as correct when they
corresponded to the original sentence. Differing from the original
procedure [45], minor changes in the sentence were accepted (i.e.
plural instead of singular, and the like). Accuracy measures were
computed as a proportion of correct answers out of the total
number of presented items. Proportion of correct responses was
then submitted to arcsine transformation in order to meet criteria
for parametric analyses.
For the Recognition Task, data were analysed using the non-
parametric indices of item discrimination A9 and response bias B0D
[46], computed according to equations (1) and (2) shown below:
A
0~1=2z½(H{FA)(1zH{FA) =½(4H)(1{FA) ð 1Þ
B00
D~½(1{H)(1{FA){(H)(FA) =
½(1{H)(1{FA)z(H)(FA) 
ð2Þ
where H indicates hit rates (i.e. correct choice of response ‘old’ for
an old item) and FA refers to false alarms (i.e. incorrect choice of
response ‘old’ for a new item). According to this procedure, an A9
value equal to 1.0 represents maximum accuracy; a value of 0.5
indicates chance-level performance. B0D values less than zero
represent a bias towards responding ‘old’ to all items; B0D greater
than zero suggests a tendency towards classifying all items as ‘new’.
In both cases, the greater the B0D score, the greater the bias.
Separate hit rates were computed for enacted and viewed items
and separate A9 and B0D were computed accordingly. For false
alarms, a single false alarm rate was used, similarly to what is
described in a previous study using a comparable paradigm [22].
For the Source Memory Task, the number of correct source
attributions was computed as a proportion of the number of hits.
This was done separately for enacted and observed items.
Table 1. Means (and standard deviations) of demographic
and clinical data for two groups (Asperger and Comparison).
Asperger Comparison
N (male:female ratio) 15:3 14:4
Age in years
(mean, SD, range)
26.2 (7.8); 17–39 27.7 (4.9); 22–40
Education in years
(mean, SD)
15.5 (3) 15.4 (4)
Full scale IQ 107.4 (21.7) 106.7 (14.6)
Verbal IQ 114.2 (23.2) 115.8 (14.7)
Performance IQ 99.5 (17.4) 105.3 (8.5)
ADI [B,C,D] 18.7[5.2]; 11 [5.8]; 7.1 [3.2]
Grober & Buschke Test
Immediate Recall
1 15.8 (0.3)
Free Recall (1st; 2nd; 3
rd) 9.4 (2) 11.7(2.2) 13.5 (1.8)
Cued Recall (1st; 2nd; 3rd) 5.3 (1.9) 4.1(1.8) 2.3 (1.7)
Faux Pas Test
2
(total score)
40.3 (8.7) 54.3 (5.7)
1Mean values (SD); normal scores.9 (max score=16).
2Max score=60.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013370.t001
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scores on the Free Recall and Source Memory Task were
submitted to separate 262 ANOVAs, with group (AS, comparison
participants) as between-subjects factor and type of encoding
(enacted, observed) as within-subjects factor. The Scheffe ` test was
used for post-hoc comparisons. For these statistics, the alpha level
for acceptance was set at 0.05.
Results
Free Recall Task
On average, comparison participants freely recalled about 42%
of the actions presented in part I; this percentage decreased to
35% in participants with AS. In detail (Table 2 and Figure 2),
comparison participants correctly reported more enacted than
observed items, while individuals with AS reported a comparable
(and overall minor) number of items from both conditions. A 2-
way ANOVA on proportion of correct recalls revealed no main
effect of group (F(1,34)=3.51, p=.065, r=.25), but a highly
significant effect of type of Encoding (F(1,34)=44.45,
p,.0000001, r=.75), and a significant interaction between Group
and type of Encoding (F(1,34)=9.14, p,.005, r=.46). Type of
Encoding affected recall, with a greater number of enacted items
being recalled. The interaction was due to participants with AS
recalling significantly fewer enacted items compared to compar-
ison participants (mean diff.=.14; p,.009), whereas the propor-
tion of the observed items was comparable in the two groups
(mean diff.=2.018; p=.958) (Figure 2). In addition, a significant
difference between proportions of enacted vs. observed encoded
items emerged only for comparison participants (mean diff.=.24;
p,.0003), whereas no difference between Encoding conditions
was found for the group with AS (mean diff.=.08; p=.112).
Recognition Task
The ANOVA on A9 (discrimination) scores showed a highly
significant type of Encoding (F(1,34)=29.28, p,.000005, r=.69),
but neither main effect of group (F(1,34)=3.36, p=.075, r=.32)
nor significant interaction (F(1,34)=.083, p=.77, r=.73). Both
Figure 1. Schematic description of the procedure applied in part I.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013370.g001
Figure 2. Mean proportion of correctly recalled items on the
Free Recall Task for the two groups (Asperger and Compari-
son). The bars represent means and the whiskers represent standard
errors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013370.g002
Table 2. Mean values (and standard deviations) for the three
memory tasks (Free recall, Recognition, Source Memory) and
the two groups (Asperger and Comparison).
Asperger Comparison
Enacted Observed Enacted Observed
Free recall 0.39 (0.13) 0.31 (0.14) 0.54 (0.14) 0.30 (0.16)
Recognition
A9 (discrimination) 0.95 (0.04) 0.92 (0.07) 0.98 (0.02) 0.94 (0.03)
B0D (bias) 20.13 (0.76) 0.42 (0.58) 20.27 (0.71) 0.61 (0.35)
Source memory Hit
rates
0.93 (0.08) 0.84 (0.14) 0.97 (0.04) 0.84 (0.09)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013370.t002
Action Memory in Autism
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recognized a comparable proportion of items (mean=.94;
SD=.05 and mean=.96; SD=.02, respectively). Type of
Encoding affected responses: observed items (mean=.93;
SD=.02) led to significantly fewer correct responses compared
to enacted ones (mean=.97; SD=.06) (Table 2 and Figure 3,
upper panel). In view of the excellent performance of the two
groups, we verified that A9 scores significantly differed from a
ceiling response (i.e. 100% correct detections) by running separate
t-tests on enacted and observed items. All p-values were below
.001.
The ANOVA on B0D (bias) scores showed only a significant
main effect of type of Encoding (F(1,34)=26.36, p,.00001,
r=.67), whereas the main effect of group (F(1,34)=.0006, p=.97,
r=.32) and the interaction between Group and type of Encoding
(F(1,34)=1.31, p=.26, r=.77) were not significant. The two
groups showed a similar bias, which was stronger for observed
items compared to enacted ones (observed: mean=.52; SD=.47;
enacted: mean=.20; SD=.73). Separate t-tests were run to assess
whether B0D scores were significantly above zero (a B0D score of
zero representing an absence of bias). Results confirmed a genuine
positive bias for observed items only (comparison participants:
t(20)=8.063, p,.0000001, r=.87; participants with AS:
t(17)=3.026, p,.008, r=.59), i.e. a conservative bias towards
responding ‘new’ to the presented sentences.
Source Memory Task
The ANOVA on accuracy scores yielded no group difference
(F(1,29)=.95, p=.34, r=.18), but a significant main effect of type
of Encoding (F(1,29)=27.50, p=.000001, r=.70) (Table 2 and
Figure 3, lower panel). Overall, enacted items (mean=.95;
SD=06) led to a greater proportion of correct responses, as
compared to observed items (mean=.84; SD=.12). No significant
interaction was observed.
An ANOVA comparing overall hit rates for Recognition and
Source Memory tasks in participants with AS shows a main effect
of task (F(1,13)=13.32; ,.0029, r=.71). Hit rate was superior on
the first task (Recognition: M=.84; SD=.12), as compared to the
second task presented (Source Memory: M=.74; SD=.19).
Correlation analyses
Correlations between participant’s recall score, IQ level, and
score on the Grober & Buschke Test were computed to determine
whether performances on Free Recall and Recognition tasks were
related to Verbal memory and Verbal IQ as well as to
Performance IQ. Bonferroni corrected p was set at .003. No
significant correlations emerged. Moreover, six separate correla-
tion analyses (Pearson Product Moment test) were performed
between memory measures for enacted and observed items on the
three experimental tasks (Free Recall, Recognition and Source
Memory) and ToM ability, as assessed by the Faux Pas task.
Bonferroni corrected p was set at .008. No significant correlations
emerged.
Discussion
The present results showed the absence of enactment effect, i.e.
a positive difference between the proportions of enacted vs.
observed (visually and verbally encoded) items in individuals with
AS. Interestingly, this result emerged only when they were
engaged in voluntary retrieval of previously presented items (i.e.
Free Recall task), suggesting that participants with AS did not
benefit from performing the actions to the same extent as
participants with typical development. In fact, when successively
tested on New-Old and Source Memory Recognition tasks, the
two groups showed similar performance. We believe that these
findings are poorly explained in terms of a general episodic
memory deficit and that the absence of an enactment effect on the
Free Recall task in individuals with AS might reflect two possible
impairments: either they have lost the ability to store the
distinctive cues that characterize self-generated events or they
might fail to access self-relevant information. We will discuss these
issues in detail.
A diminished enactment effect: loss of privileged ‘self’
status?
Although memory impairments are reported in autism and
Asperger Syndrome [11,14,15,18,24], it is unlikely that the present
findings can be explained as stemming from a general episodic
memory deficit. Indeed, recall of other-performed (visually and
verbally encoded) actions was unaffected in our group with AS
and, although only one measure was investigated here (i.e. the
Grober and Buschke test), verbal memory was within the normal
range. In addition, no correlation emerged between measures on
Recall and Recognition tasks and Verbal/Performance IQ scores
or Verbal Memory abilities. Similarly, the improved performance
of individuals with AS on the Recognition and Source Memory
tasks, as compared to Free Recall, is unlikely to depend on the
repeated presentation of the items. Were this the case, one would
expect a learning effect, namely that the blocked order of task
Figure 3. Accuracy in the Recognition and Source Memory
tasks for the two groups (Asperger and Comparison). In the
upper panel, A9 is given as index of discrimination abilities (the larger
the index the more accurate the performance), in the lower panel, hit
rate is provided. The bars represent means and the whiskers represent
standard errors.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013370.g003
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accuracy, reinforcing correct old/new recognition and attenuating
source memory impairments. This was not found: direct
comparison of the proportion of hit rates on the Recognition
and Source Memory tasks rather suggests the opposite pattern,
namely a better performance on the first rather than on the second
task. Hence, the improved performance on the Recognition and
Source Memory tasks, which require the retrieval of contextual
elements from episodic memory to a lesser extent, might be due to
the AS group’s employing explicit recollection strategies based on
a preserved semantic memory. Accordingly, the lack of enactment
effect they exhibited on the Free Recall task would reflect specific
difficulties in constructing personal episodic traces. This might be
due to a failure to properly encode motor and proprioceptive
information which would selectively impair certain aspects of
personal episodic memory, along with a preserved verbal semantic
memory [15,16,22].
Why would individuals with AS benefit less from the distinctive
cues characterizing self-generated events? While memory traces
for self-performed actions are more salient because they involve an
additional motoric component, individuals with AS might not
entirely benefit from information associated with action execution,
such as efferent or central motor signals or reafferent feedback
signals from proprioception. The matching between central
signals, motor reafferences, and visual and proprioceptive
feedbacks, is a crucial mechanism involved in action monitoring
[34]. The argument is that because individuals with AS fail to
integrate these signals, they do not monitor their actions as their
own and do not benefit of memory enhancement for self-
performed actions. It is also possible that a defective sensori-
motor integration might reflect a disrupted ‘‘binding mechanism’’,
i.e. the process responsible for associating visual and sensori-motor
information related to the self to semantic information pertaining
to the action [47]. In this view, episodic information could be only
partially integrated and, consequently, visual and semantic
information might overwhelm sensorimotor signals, leading to a
substantial similarity between enacted and observed actions.
Similarly, Russell and Jarrold [32] have suggested that
insufficient monitoring of self-performed actions in autism would
be associated with an impaired ability to relate motor commands
to their visual outcomes by means of visual action schemata.
Difficulties in anticipating the sensory consequences of one’s motor
output [48], as well as in motor planning [31,49] and action
prediction [50] have already been reported in individuals with
ASD. In particular, using electromyographic (EMG) recordings,
Cattaneo and collaborators [48], have shown that, unlike children
with typical development, no EMG activity of the mouth muscle
was found in children with ASD during the execution of first phase
of the action sequence, and a delayed activation only appeared
during the last phase, suggesting that they were unable to
anticipate their own action.
Nevertheless, the existing evidence in favour of an action
monitoring deficit is somewhat inconclusive [22,27,31,32]. In a
previous study, Lind and Bowler [22] have shown an impaired
self-other source memory along with an undiminished recognition
memory and a preserved enactment effect in children with ASD.
These discrepancies might be explained by differences between the
two samples (chronological age and IQ scores) as well as in task
design. While Lind and Bowler’s task relied on the ability to recall
who picked up and named a given picture card (i.e. the participant
or the experimenter), in our experiment the enactment effect relies
on the memory traces for self-performed actions which have a
different salience in terms of the specific motor component
involved. Similarly, the source memory task used in Lind and
Bowler’s study taps on the ability to encode particular items (e.g.,
the card picture and the picture name) in self-relevant ways, while
in our study the source memory task implies the ability to
distinguish self-performed from other-performed actions, each
characterized by distinctive motor components.
Difficulties in self-others source memory and action monitoring
have not consistently been found when on-line discrimination of
one’s own actions from those of an external agent was required
[26,27]. In particular, Williams and Happe ´ [27] reported intact
action monitoring, as well as a typical self-reference effect in
recalling their own actions in participants with ASD. However,
according to the authors, the employment of relatively more able
individuals, together with overt verbal commentaries, strongly
encouraged by the experimenter, might account for the self-
reference effect displayed by participants with ASD, and thus for
the discrepancies with previous literature [28–30].
A diminished enactment effect: failure to access self-
relevant information?
On a different view, the lack of enactment effect on the Free
Recall task, reported here in individuals with AS, might reflect an
inability to access self-relevant information, a disturbance that has
been related to a ToM deficit, i.e., the ability to represent others’
and one’s own intentions, beliefs and experiences [51,52].
However, the present findings could be hardly explained by a
deficit in ToM since, if this was the case, one would expect to find
a more severe difficulty with tasks in which self-other attribution
is explicitly required, as on the Source Memory task. In addition,
no correlation emerged between measures of recall and source
memory and scores on the Faux Pas test, an advanced ToM task.
Indeed, autobiographical reports suggest that individuals with AS
do have access to their own memories and past experiences,
although self-awareness and introspective reflection are phenom-
enologically different from those observed in people with typical
development. Episodic autobiographical memories in individuals
with ASD often have a ‘‘perspective-free’’ character; they may be
fewer in number and lacking in specific details [17,18], or
predominantly (and even exclusively) visual in content [53].
These findings are in accordance with the view that subtle
impairments in encoding distinctive motor and proprioceptive
cues during action execution might selectively affect personal
episodic memory. Thus, individuals with AS do not show an
implicit facilitation effect for self-performed actions on Free
Recall, and only show a retrieval advantage for these events when
recall is cued [c.f., 30,54], or on recognition tasks in which more
explicit cognitive strategies based on their intact verbal abilities or
semantic memory are employed [c.f., 6, 22]. This view is
consistent with a diminished (rather than entirely disrupted) form
of autonoetic awareness (i.e. the state of remembering) along with
an unimpaired noetic awareness (i.e. the state of knowing) [55].
Concluding remarks
In conclusion, we believe that the reduced enactment effect in
adults with AS reveals an impaired action monitoring system,
likely associated with an insufficient use of motor and proprio-
ceptive information or with an inadequate sensorimotor integra-
tion. Subtle difficulties in encoding specific motor signals during
action execution might affect retrieval of relevant personal
episodic information, as well as the development of an extended
sense of self in individuals with AS. Future studies are needed to
further investigate this hypothesis by carefully and systematically
varying visual, motor and efferent signals during action execution
tasks.
Action Memory in Autism
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 October 2010 | Volume 5 | Issue 10 | e13370Supporting Information
Appendix S1
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013370.s001 (0.02 MB
DOC)
Acknowledgments
The authors wish to thank Richard Carter and the two anonymous
reviewers for their helpful comments on a previous version of the
manuscript, and Astrid Stopin for clinical and neuropsychological
evaluations.
Author Contributions
Conceived and designed the experiments: TZ ED DN. Performed the
experiments: TZ AMS PC ML. Analyzed the data: TZ ED. Wrote the
paper: TZ ED.
References
1. American Psychiatry Association (2000) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders. 4
th Edition DSM-IV-TR (Text Revision). Washington, DC:
American Psychiatry Association.
2. ICD-10 (1992) Classification of Mental and Behavioural Disorders Diagnostic
criteria for research. World Health Organization.
3. Premack D, Woodruff G (1978) Does the Chimpanzee Have a Theory of Mind.
Behav Brain Sci 1(4): 515–526.
4. Dahlgren SO, Trillingsgaard A (1996) Theory of mind in non-retarded children
with autism and Asperger’s syndrome. J Child Psychol Psychiat 37(6): 759–763.
5. Happe ´ FGE (1995) The role of age and verbal ability in the Theory of Mind task
performance of subjects with autism. Child Dev 66: 843–855.
6. Happe ´ FGE (1994) An advanced test of theory of mind: Understanding of story
characters’ thoughts and feelings by able autistic, mentally handicapped and
normal children and adults. J Autism Dev Disord 24: 129–154.
7. Baron-Cohen S, O’Riordan M, Stone V, Jones R, Plaisted K (1999) Recognition
of faux pas by normally developing children and children with Asperger
syndrome or high-functioning autism. J Autism Dev Disord 29(5): 407–418.
8. Zalla T, Stopin A, Adahe S, Sav AM, Leboyer M (2009) Faux Pas Detection and
Intentional Action in Asperger Syndrome. A Replication on a French Sample.
J Autism Dev Disord 39(2): 373–382.
9. Wing L (1981) Asperger’s syndrome: A clinical account. Psychol Med 11:
115–129.
10. Hermelin B, O’Connor N (1970) Psychological experiments with autistic
children. Oxford: Pergamon Press.
11. Boucher J, Lewis V (1989) Memory impairments and communication in
relatively able autistic children. J Child Psychol Psychiat 30: 99–122.
12. Tager-Flusberg H (1991) Semantic processing in the free recall of autistic
children: Further evidence for a cognitive deficit. Brit J Dev Psychol 9: 417–430.
13. Minshew NJ, Goldstein G, Taylor HG, Siegel DJ (1994) Academic achievement
in high functioning autistic individuals. J Clin Exp Neuropsychol 16(2): 261–70.
14. Bowler DM, Matthews NJ, Gardiner JM (1997) Asperger’s syndrome and
memory: Similarity to autism but not amnesia. Neuropsychologia 35: 65–70.
15. Bowler DM, Gardiner JM, Grice S, Saavalainen P (2000) Memory illusions:
False recall and recognition in adults with Asperger’s syndrome. J Abnorm
Psychol 109: 663–672.
16. Bowler DM, Gardiner JM, Grice S (2000) Episodic memory and remembering
in adults with Asperger’s syndrome. J Autism Dev Disord 30: 305–316.
17. Crane L, Goddard L (2008) Episodic and semantic autobiographical memory in
adults with autism spectrum disorders. J Autism Dev Disord 38: 498–506.
18. Tanweer T, Rathbone CJ, Souchay C (2010) Autobiographical memory,
autonoetic consciousness, and identity in Asperger syndrome. Neuropsychologia
48(4): 900–8.
19. Bowler DM, Gardiner JM, Berthollier N (2004) Source memory in Asperger’s
syndrome. J Autism Dev Disord 34: 533–542.
20. Hala S, Rasmussen C, Henderson AM (2005) Three types of source monitoring
by children with and without autism: the role of executive. J Autism Dev Disord
35(1): 75–89.
21. O’Shea AG, Fein DA, Cillessen AHN, Klin A, Schultz RT (2005) Source
memory in children with autism spectrum disorders. Dev Neuropsychol 27:
337–360.
22. Lind SE, Bowler DM (2009) Recognition memory, self-other source memory,
and theory-of-mind in children with autism spectrum disorder. J Autism Dev
Disord 39: 1231–1239.
23. Johnson MK, Hashtroudi S, Lindsay S (1993) Source monitoring. Psychol Bull
114: 3–29.
24. Farrant A, Blades M, Boucher J (1998) Source Monitoring by Children with
Autism. J Autism Dev Disord 28(1): 43–50.
25. Russell J, Jarrold C (1999) Memory for actions in children with autism: self
versus other. Cog Neuropsychiatry 4: 303–331.
26. Hill E, Russell J (2002) Action memory and self-monitoring in children with
autism: Self versus other. Infant Child Dev 11: 159–170.
27. Williams DM, Happe ´ F (2009) Pre-conceptual aspects of self-awareness in
autism spectrum disorder: The case of action-monitoring. J Autism Dev Disord
39: 251–259.
28. Millward C, Powell S, Messer D, Jordan R (2000) Recall for self and other in
autism: children’s memory for events experienced by themselves and their peers.
J Autism Dev Disord 30(1): 15–28.
29. Toichi M, Kamio Y, Okada T, Sakihama M, Youngstrom, et al. (2002) A Lack
of Self-Consciousness in Autism. Am J Psychiat 159(8): 1422–1424.
30. Hare DJ, Mellor C, Azmi S (2007) Episodic memory in adults with autistic
spectrum disorders: Recall for self- versus other-experienced events. Res Dev
Disabil 28(3): 317–329.
31. Hughes C (1996) Planning problems in autism at the level of motor control.
J Autism Dev Disord 26: 101–109.
32. Russell J, Jarrold C (1998) Error-correction problems in autism: Evidence for a
monitoring impairment? J Autism Dev Disord 28: 45–61.
33. Blakemore SJ, Frith CD, Wolpert DM (2001) The cerebellum is involved in
predicting the sensory consequences of action. Neuroreport 12(9): 1879–1884.
34. Blakemore SJ, Wolpert DM, Frith CD (2002) Abnormalities in the awareness of
action. Trends Cogn Sci 6(6): 237–242.
35. Wolpert DM, Ghahramani Z, Jordan MI (1995) An internal model for
sensorimotor integration. Science 269(5232): 1880–1882.
36. Jeannerod M, Pacherie E (2004) Agency, simulation and self-identification.
Mind & Language 19: 113–146.
37. Castiello U, Paulignan Y, Jeannerod M (1991) Temporal dissociation of motor
responses and subjective awareness. Brain 114: 2639–2655.
38. Engelkamp J (1998) Memory for actions. Hove, UK: Psychology Press.
39. Baker-Ward L, Hess TM, Flannagan DA (1990) The effects of involvement on
children’s memory for events. Cognitive Dev 5: 55–69.
40. Gillberg C, Gillberg C, Ra ˚stam M, Wentz E (2001) The Asperger Syndrome
(and High-Functioning Autism) Diagnostic Interview (ASDI): A Preliminary
Study of a New Structured Clinical Interview. Autism 5(1): 57–66.
41. Lord C, Rutter M, Le Couteur A (1994) Autism diagnostic interview-revised: A
recise version of a diagnostic interview for caregivers of individuals with possible
pervasive developmental disorders. J Autism Dev Disord 24: 659–685.
42. Hansson SL, Svanstrom Rojvall A, Rastam M, Gillberg C, Gillberg C, et al.
(2005) Psychiatric telephone interview with parents for screening of childhood
autism-tics, attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder and other comorbidities (A-
TAC): Preliminary reliability and validity. Brit J Psychiat 187: 262–267.
43. Wechsler D (1999) Echelle clinique de me ´moire de Wechsler-re ´vise ´: Manuel.
Paris: Centre de Psychologie Applique ´e.
44. Ergis AM, Van Der Linden M, Boller F, Degos JD, Deweer B (1995) Me ´moire
visuospatiale a ` court et a ` long terme dans la maladie d’Alzheimer de ´butante.
Neuropsychologia Latina 1: 18–25.
45. Daprati E, Nico D, Saimpont A, Franck N, Sirigu A (2005) Memory and action:
an experimental study on normal subjects and schizophrenic patients.
Neuropsychologia 43(2): 281–93.
46. Donaldson W (1992) Measuring recognition memory. J Exp Psychol Gen 121:
275–277.
47. Uhlhaas PJ, Singer W (2007) What Do Disturbances in Neural Synchrony Tell
Us About Autism? Biol Psychiat 62: 190–191.
48. Cattaneo L, Fabbri-Destro M, Boria S, Pieraccini C, Monti A, et al. (2007)
Impairment of actions chains in autism and its possible role in intention
understanding. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 104(45): 17825–30.
49. Fabbri-Destro M, Cattaneo L, Boria S, Rizzolatti G (2009) Planning actions in
autism. Exp Brain Res 192(3): 521–5.
50. Zalla T, Labruyere N, Cle ´ment A, Georgieff N (2010) Predicting Ensuing
Actions in Children and Adolescents with Autism Spectrum Disorders. Exp
Brain Res 201(4): 809–19.
51. Frith U, Happe F (1999) Theory of mind and self consciousness: what is it like to
be autistic? Mind & Language 14(1): 82–89.
52. Williams DM, Happe ´ F (2009) What did I say? versus What did I think?:
Attributing false beliefs to self amongst children with and without autism.
J Autism Dev Disord 39: 865–873.
53. Hulburt R, Happe ´ F, Frith U (1994) Sampling the Inner Experience of Autism:
A Preliminary Report. Psychol Med 24: 385–395.
54. Powell SD, Jordan RR (1993) Being subjective about autistic thinking and
learning to learn. Educ Psychol 13: 359–370.
55. Tulving E (1983) Elements of episodic memory. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Action Memory in Autism
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 7 October 2010 | Volume 5 | Issue 10 | e13370